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Thinkable: The Charter and Refugee
Law after Appulonappa and B010
Colin Grey

I. INTRODUCTION
Appulonappa1 and its companion case, B010,2 lie at the confluence of
many debates about global migration and its governance. Both cases
arose following the arrival in Canada of hundreds of Sri Lankan Tamils
on two cargo boats, the M.V. Ocean Lady in October 2009 and the M.V.
Sun Sea in August 2010. These were asylum seekers who came to
Canada on dangerous vessels because more secure, less costly routes
were shut to them.3 They were also illegal immigrants whose success
entering Canada might fuel more migrant smuggling, a transnational
criminal phenomenon with the potential to undermine national security.4
Safe to say, the former Conservative government adopted the latter view
and proceeded accordingly.5 And it was a blow to the government’s
enforcement-minded response when the Supreme Court unanimously

Profésseur régulier, Département des sciences juridiques, UQÀM. I would like to thank
Audrey Macklin, Gerald Heckman, David Vinokur and an anonymous reviewer for providing
extraordinarily helpful comments, as well as Louis-Philippe Jannard for research assistance. I am
grateful to UQÀM’s Programme d’aide financière à la recherche et à la creation and to the
Foundation for Legal Research for funding a longer-term project on immigration constitutionalism,
of which this article is a part. Finally, I am grateful to the organizers of Osgoode Hall’s 2015
Constitutional Cases Conference, where I presented an earlier version of this article.
1
R. v. Appulonappa, [2015] S.C.J. No. 59, 2015 SCC 59 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] B.C.J. No.
762 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Appulonappa”].
2
B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] S.C.J. No. 58, 2015 SCC 58
(S.C.C.), revg [2013] F.C.J. No. 322 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “B010”].
3
For such a view of anti-smuggling measures, see Scott Watson, “The Criminalization of
Human and Humanitarian Smuggling” (2015) 1:1 Migration, Mobility & Displacement 39.
4
See Benjamin Perrin, “Migrant Smuggling: Canada’s Response to a Global Criminal
Enterprise” (2013) 1:2 International Journal of Social Science 139, at 144-45.
5
For background on the government’s response to the Sun Sea and (despite the title)
Ocean Lady, see Canadian Council of Refugees, Sun Sea: Five years later (August 2015), online:
<http://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/sun-sea-five-years-later.pdf>; Douglas Quan, “Five years
after the MV Sun Sea’s arrival, crackdown on ‘irregular arrivals’ draws praise, scorn” National Post
(August 6, 2015).
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found that the government could neither prosecute (in Appulonappa) nor
find inadmissible (in B010) asylum seekers for helping one another enter
the country illegally, nor could it take such actions against humanitarian
workers or family members acting from non-financial motives.
In what follows, I am not concerned with whether these decisions are
wise or just, nor with whether they properly reflect Canada’s international
obligations with respect to human rights, refugees and the international
struggle against migrant smuggling. My concern is instead with their
impact on immigration constitutionalism in Canada. “Constitutionalism” is
a high-flown, contested term. Because my main concern is with the cases,
and not the theory of constitutionalism as such, all I can do here is stipulate
that by it, I refer to an ideal according to which enforceable norms, such as
those propounded in the form of immigration law, are subjected to the
discipline of legal justification, through the medium of various institutional
forms and practices, including judicial review based on a written bill of
rights like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6 Simplifying
greatly, I will assume that the ideal of constitutionalism is more robust
the more it allows for the possibility of further legal justification:7 the
more responses it yields to each successive “why?”. A more robust
constitutionalism continues to offer answers to such questions, down to a
fundamental level. A weaker constitutionalism shuts down such questioning
with a peremptory “because”. A robust constitutionalism also provides
greater assurance that exercises of government power, here the power to
control immigration, are not arbitrary. The more justification is made
available, the greater authority of the constituted legal system.8
In the context of immigration constitutionalism, we are distinctively
concerned with the justification of, hence the authority, of the legal norms
of immigration governance. I will argue that the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions are disappointing for those who favour a robust immigration
constitutionalism. To begin, the outcomes in Appulonappa and B010 do
not rest on any enduring constitutional principles and may be upended —
6
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
7
See Mark Walters, “The Unwritten Constitution as a Legal Concept” in David Dyzenhaus
& Malcolm Thornburn, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016) 33, at 49. Note that my claim in this article is that the Supreme Court has, in
various ways, limited the possibility of robust immigration constitutionalism. I do not ask (1)
whether it is desirable or required to extend the ideal of constitutionalism to immigration
governance; (2) whether it is possible to extend constitutionalism to this domain.
8
For a clear articulation of the relationship between constitutionalism and authority, see
Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 39-43.
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indeed, as I will explain in the next section, may already have been
upended — by legislative changes (Section 2); here the focus is on the
Court’s instrumentalist methodology for determining the demands of
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. In the remaining three
sections, I focus on the issue of when the guarantee of fundamental justice
found in section 7 is engaged in the immigration context. On this point,
B010 repeated statements from the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in
Febles9 in a way that seemed to contradict, without explanation, the
Supreme Court’s 1985 landmark holding in Singh10 that it would be
“unthinkable” if section 7 did not provide fundamental justice in the
adjudication of refugee protection claims (Sections 3 and 4). Finally, I will
argue that this retreat from Singh has several structural implications that
dim the prospects for a robust immigration constitutionalism going
forward (Section 5).
At the outset, it may help the reader unfamiliar with the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act11 (“the IRPA” or “the Act”) to explain two
aspects of its design. First, relevant to section 2, the IRPA contains various
grounds of inadmissibility, part of its overall policy with respect to
non-citizens’ rights to enter and remain in Canada.12 Less well known, it
also contains a number of criminal offences intended to support that same
policy.13 Appulonappa and B010 both address legislative provisions that
target migrant smuggling. However, the relevant provisions in either case
target smuggling through the different lenses, respectively, of criminal law
and immigration law. One way of coming to an understanding of the
Supreme Court’s decisions in the two cases is as a response to the question
of how these different parts of the scheme relate to one another.
Second, relevant to sections 3 to 5, the IRPA is marked by a series of
interwoven decision chains, such that different officials at different
junctures make related, sometimes identical, substantive decisions. Of
particular importance here, decisions related to refugee protection may be
made (1) when an officer of Citizenship and Immigration14 (“CIC”)
9
Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2014] S.C.J. No. 68, 2014 SCC 68
(S.C.C.), affg [2012] F.C.J. No. 1609 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Febles”].
10
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.), affd [1986] F.C.J. No. 450 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Singh”].
11
S.C. 2001, c. 27.
12
IRPA, Part 1, Division 4.
13
IRPA, Part 3.
14
IRPA, ss. 99 to 101. Note that the “applied title” for the Department of Citizenship and
Immigration is now “Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada” (“IRCC”). Similarly, the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration is now referred to as the “Minister of Immigration,
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decides if a refugee protection claim is eligible to be referred to the
Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”) of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (“IRB”); (2) when either of the RPD or Refugee Appeal Division
(“RAD”), also part of the IRB, pronounce on a claim;15 (3) when either a
CIC officer or a delegate of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness decide on a subsequent pre-removal risk assessment
(“PRRA”), a largely paper-based process available to most non-citizens
prior to removal;16 (4) when a Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”)
enforcement officer is asked to defer the removal of a non-citizen for
reasons of risk;17 and (5) on judicial review by the Federal Courts of any of
these decisions.18 In conception, seemingly, the RPD and the RAD,
independent tribunals with competence to decide Charter issues and
greater procedural protections, are the centrepieces of this overall scheme.
Eligibility determinations serve a gatekeeping function governing access to
these tribunals. Later PRRA and deferral decisions provide additional
safeguards to ensure Canada’s compliance with the international law
principle of non-refoulement, which imposes an obligation not to return
individuals to countries where they would be at risk of certain kinds of
serious harm. However, as I will argue, the net effect of B010 and Febles is
to shift constitutional accountability to these latter stages.

II. THE CASES: APPULONAPPA AND B010
1. Appulonappa
Appulonappa involved a constitutional challenge by the captain and
three crewmembers of the Ocean Lady to the former section 117 of the
IRPA. This provision sets out the criminal offence of “organizing entry
into Canada” — otherwise referred to as migrant, human, or people
smuggling — under which the four men were charged. Invoking section 7
Refugees and Citizenship”. However the legal titles remain the “Department of Citizenship and
Immigration”, as found in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, S.C. 1994, c. 31, and
the “Minister of Citizenship and Immigration”, as found in the IRPA. In this article, I employ the
legal titles. I thank David Vinokur for the information used in this footnote.
15
IRPA, para. 95(1)(b).
16
IRPA, ss. 112-114.
17
Authority for this discretion has been located in IRPA, s. 48. See Wang v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 295, [2001] 3 F.C.R. 682 (F.C.T.D.)
[hereinafter “Wang”].
18
Access to judicial review is governed by IRPA, ss. 72-74, as well as by the Federal
Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
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of the Charter, the accused argued that section 117 violated the substantive
principle of fundamental justice that a law must not be overbroad.19 To
apply the anti-overbreadth principle you ask “whether a law that takes
away rights in a way that generally supports the object of the law, goes
too far by denying the rights of some individuals in a way that bears no
relation to the object”.20 Accordingly, the accused argued that the former
section 117 went too far by potentially capturing not just those who
smuggled people into Canada “for a financial or other material benefit”21
(such as the appellants themselves) but also “people who assist close
family members to come to Canada and humanitarians who assist those
fleeing persecution to come to Canada, in each case without required
documents”.22
A unanimous Supreme Court accepted this argument. Writing for the
Court, the Chief Justice reasoned that “the true purpose of s. 117 is to
combat people smuggling”, and “people smuggling” (as defined in B010,
more on which below) excludes “mere humanitarian conduct, mutual
assistance or aid to family members”.23 Given this “true purpose”, the
provision cast its net too widely. The constitutional infirmity could not be
saved under section 1 of the Charter,24 so the Chief Justice read down the
provision to exclude “(1) humanitarian aid to undocumented entrants,
(2) mutual aid amongst asylum-seekers, and (3) assistance to family entering
without the required documents”.25
In evaluating this result, it is worth emphasizing that Appulonappa
dealt with the former section 117. The easy assumption may be that the
new section 117 would also be read down to exclude the same three
categories of persons. But this is not in fact a safe assumption, owing to
the means-ends analytical approach the Supreme Court has adopted to
section 7 in recent years.
19
R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.), affg [1982] B.C.J.
No. 2596 (B.C.C.A.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, at
paras. 101-102, 112-119 (S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”];
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, at paras. 85-88 (S.C.C.),
revg [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227 (B.C.C.A.); Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law: 2012), at 133-36.
20
Carter, id., at para. 85.
21
This phrasing comes from B010, supra, note 2, at paras. 5 and 76.
22
Appulonappa, supra, note 1, at para. 25. The challenge was raised in a voir dire at trial:
R. v. Appulonappa, [2013] B.C.J. No. 35, 2013 BCSC 31 (B.C.S.C.), revd [2014] B.C.J. No. 762,
2014 BCCA 163 (B.C.C.A.).
23
Id., at paras. 34 and 48.
24
Id., at paras. 79-82.
25
Id., at para. 84. For some discussion, see B010, supra, note 2, at para. 60.
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Changes to subsection 117(1) significantly broaden the mental (mens
rea) and physical (actus reus) elements of the offence.26 In addition, new
aggravating factors now require more severe penalties if the offence “was
for profit, or was for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a
criminal organization or terrorist group”.27 If profit, the involvement of a
criminal organization, or the involvement of a terrorist group are aggravating
factors, it seems to follow straightforwardly that an unaggravated offence
does not require such elements and, more importantly, that it was not meant
to. Such modifications render more plausible the Crown’s unsuccessful
argument in Appulonappa that the purpose of section 117 is “to prevent all
organizing and assisting of unlawful entry of others into Canada, including
assistance to close family members and humanitarian assistance”.28
The broader view of the objective of section 117 is also supported by
other amendments to the IRPA, which create a new statutory context that
arguably places an even greater premium on the Act’s enforcement and
control objectives. For example, section 20.1 of the IRPA seems to allow
the designation of a group of asylum seekers helping one another come to
Canada “irregularly”, with designation leading to significant consequences,
such as mandatory detention for all those 16 or older.29 If such a significant
consequence, among others,30 can be visited upon asylum seekers engaged
in mutual aid, on what basis can it be said that the new section 117 was not
intended to have a similar scope?
All of which is to say that it is unclear whether the Supreme Court’s
conclusion provides dependable guidance on the constitutionality of the
new section 117. I am inclined to think that it does not; that Appulonappa
26
For ease of reference, I reproduce the old and new versions of s. 117 of the IRPA, with
the changes underlined:

Former section 117
117 (1) No person shall knowingly
organize, induce, aid or abet the coming into
Canada of one or more persons who are not in
possession of a visa, passport or other document
required by this Act.

New section 117
117 (1) No person shall organize, induce,
aid or abet the coming into Canada of one or
more persons knowing that, or being reckless as
to whether, their coming into Canada is or would
be in contravention of this Act.

For discussion of these amendments, see Perrin, “Migrant Smuggling”, supra, note 4, at 144-45.
27
IRPA, s. 117(3.1)(a)(ii), (3.2)(a)(ii).
28
Appulonappa, supra, note 1, at para. 13. This was the government’s stated position,
accepted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal: supra, note 22, at paras. 5, 41.
29
IRPA, s. 55(3.1).
30
Other consequences added to the IRPA include longer waits for detention reviews (IRPA,
s. 57.1) and a less favourable refugee determination process, through the denial of a right of appeal
to the RAD (IRPA, s. 110(2)(a)), as well as the denial of an automatic stay of removal pending
judicial review (Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s. 231).
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is a case, like the Supreme Court’s decision in Agraira, where legislative
changes render the Supreme Court’s decision dead letter.31 The new
section 117 seems to have a new end, and a new end makes all the
difference in the means-end analysis. As I will now explain, this conclusion
also has implications for our understanding of B010.
2. B010
Appulonappa involved the crew of the Ocean Lady. B010 involved Sun
Sea passengers who had taken on positions of varying responsibility after
the ship’s original crew had abandoned it. These were “asylum seekers”
engaged in “mutual aid”: B010 worked in the engine room; the co-appellant
B306 was a cook and lookout; another co-appellant, J.P., acted as assistant
navigator. A fourth, non-Sun Sea appellant, Jesus Rodríguez Hernandez, is
a Cuban national convicted about a decade ago of smuggling 48 Cubans
into the United States. The Immigration Division (“ID”) of the IRB found
all four men inadmissible under paragraph 37(1)(b) of the IRPA, that is,
“on grounds of organized criminality for … engaging, in the context of
transnational crime, in activities such as people smuggling”.32 One result
of this finding is that none were eligible to have their refugee protection
claims referred to the RPD.33
The determinative issue in B010 was one of statutory interpretation. The
Chief Justice, again writing for the full Court, found that the words
“organized criminality” and “people smuggling” in “the context of
transnational crime” did not per se exclude the possibility of smuggling
other than for pecuniary motives.34 However, taking into account the
31
Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] S.C.J. No. 36,
2013 SCC 36 (S.C.C.), affg [2011] F.C.J. No. 407 (F.C.A.). In Agraira, the Supreme Court found
that the words “national interest” that governed the Minister of Public Safety’s power to grant
discretionary relief from inadmissibility on security grounds, under the former s. 34(2) of the IRPA,
was not limited to taking into account national security and public safety. Rather, the discretionary
power encompassed broader considerations such as the values underlying the Charter and Canada’s
democratic character: id. at paras. 65, 78. Agraira was released by the Court on June 20, 2013. On
June 19, 2013, however, the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, S.C. 2013, c. 16 had received
royal assent. Among other changes, this legislation limited the Minister’s discretionary relief powers
to exclude considerations beyond national security and public safety: “the Minister may only take
into account national security and public safety considerations, but, in his or her analysis, is not
limited to considering the danger that the foreign national presents to the public or the security of
Canada.” (See id., at s. 18; now IRPA, s. 42.1(3)). In other words, the amendment reinstated the very
interpretation of the Minister’s discretionary power that had been rejected by the Supreme Court.
32
IRPA, s. 37(1)(b).
33
IRPA, s. 101(1)(f).
34
B010, supra, note 2, at paras. 33-35.

118

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

broader statutory context, the Parliamentary record, and Canada’s
international legal obligations,35 she ultimately concluded that not-for-profit
smuggling was not captured.36 “The tools of statutory interpretation”, she
wrote, “all point inexorably to the conclusion that s. 37(1)(b) applies only to
people who act to further illegal entry of asylum-seekers in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit in the context of
organized transnational crime.”37 Accordingly, the four cases were remitted
to the ID for redetermination.38
The Charter entered into the Chief Justice’s analysis in two places,
both times briefly but importantly. First, the Court dismissed the respondent
Ministers’ argument that paragraph 37(1)(b) should be read broadly to
include smuggling other than for profit in order to mirror the offence
contained in section 117 of the IRPA. This is significant because the
arguments in the four cases consolidated at the Supreme Court had all, in
the lower courts, focused on whether paragraph 37(1)(b) should be
interpreted in light of section 117.39 However, referring to her conclusion
in Appulonappa, the Chief Justice dismissed this issue summarily on the
ground that “[a] provision that is unconstitutionally overbroad cannot be
used to widen a narrower provision.”40
But: If the amendments to section 117 have made it such that it no longer
needs to be read down to be Charter-compliant, constitutional considerations
likely no longer block recourse to section 117 in the interpretation of
paragraph 37(1)(b). Going forward, the potential broadening of the purpose
35

That is, Canada’s obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 art. 33 (entered into force April 22, 1954); its Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S .267, art. 1(2), Can. T.S. 1969 No. 29
(entered into force October 4, 1967) [together, “the Refugee Convention”], as well as the Protocol
Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507
(entered into force January 28, 2004).
36
B010, supra, note 2, at para. 72.
37
Id., at para. 76.
38
Id., at para. 77. Mr. Hernandez had also been found inadmissible for serious criminality
under IRPA, s. 36(1)(b).
39
Thus the certified questions that allowed the appeals to proceed to the Federal Court of
Appeal asked whether it was appropriate to resort to s. 117 in interpreting s. 37(1)(b) of the IRPA:
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. P. (J.), [2013] F.C.J. No. 1236,
2013 FCA 262, at para. 40 (F.C.A.), revd [2015] S.C.J. No. 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “J.P.”]; B010 v.
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2013] F.C.J. No. 322, 2013 FCA 87, at para. 4 (F.C.A.),
revd [2015] S.C.J. No. 58 (S.C.C.). (Under the IRPA, to appeal a decision of the Federal Court to the
Federal Court of Appeal, the Federal Court must certify a question of general importance: IRPA,
s. 74(d).)
40
B010, supra, note 2, at 40.
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of the new section 117 may broaden the interpretation of paragraph 37(1)(b)
as well.
I do not want to overstate this claim. The Chief Justice, as I have noted,
gave several reasons in support of her conclusion with respect to the scope
of paragraph 37(1)(b). If the new section 117 is now Charter-compliant,
the question becomes whether this fact overcomes the various
considerations pulling in the other direction. In other words, it is simply no
longer “inexorably” clear that the Chief Justice’s interpretation remains
valid. This uncertainty, once again, arises from a section 7 methodology
that does not look behind Parliamentary intent. This methodology leads to
a weaker constitutionalism because, effectively, the justification of a
statute stops with the characterization of its legislative intent.41 That is
where a last “why” encounters the Court’s final “because”.
There is a response to this claim of weakness. It is that further
justification is available; only its institutional locus shifts to the political
deliberation that takes place within Parliament and in the wider public
sphere. In the domestic realm where democratic legitimacy is secured by
the participation and representation of citizens, this is a strong though
perhaps not decisive reply. As non-citizens, however, migrants are
formally excluded from domestic processes of democratic deliberation.
Therefore democratic justification can less plausibly be defended as a
form of constitutionalism when it comes to immigration governance.
In this domain, it instead looks like the imposition by fiat of one group’s
political decisions on outsiders. Hence, a robust constitutionalism in the
domain of immigration governance would have to defend the soundness
of Parliament’s choices and to be prepared to pass judgment on those
choices; in this case, for instance by stating that fundamental justice
disallows the prosecution of asylum seekers who help one another enter a
country illegally. That this was not done leaves the door open to the
kinds of prosecutions and findings of inadmissibility that the Court
sought to rule out.

41
Others have criticized this methodology on the basis that the courts are not adequately
constrained in their characterization of statutory intent. This lack of constraint allows them to
indulge in “‘result-driven’ reasoning to achieve a desired outcome”: Hart Schwartz, “Circularity,
Tautology, and Gamesmanship: ‘Purpose’ based Proportionality-Correspondence Analysis in
Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter” (2015) 35 N.J.C.L. 105, at 108. My argument is that the
amendments to s. 117 also suggest the contrary weakness. By demurring on any constitutional
inquiry into a statute’s ends, the means-ends analysis makes the constitutional outcome overly
contingent on Parliament’s intent.
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III. B010, FEBLES AND FOUR READINGS OF SINGH
Thus the first mention of the Charter in B010 was to the now possibly
irrelevant conclusion in Appulonappa. The second place the Charter
surfaced was when the Chief Justice addressed an alternative argument
that the inadmissibility ground in paragraph 37(1)(b) of the IRPA is
constitutionally overbroad, as was argued with respect to section 117 in
Appulonappa. The Chief Justice found it unnecessary to address this
argument in light of her conclusion on the statutory interpretation issue.
However, she added in obiter that section 7 cannot be used to interpret
paragraph 37(1)(b) of the IRPA. This is because the determination of
inadmissibility, even though it may lead to ineligibility to have one’s
refugee protection claim heard by RPD, did not engage section 7.
As authority for this statement, she relied on a holding made a year
earlier from her majority opinion in Febles.42 Febles was a judicial review
of an RPD decision involving the interpretation of article 1F(b) of the
Refugee Convention, a clause that excludes from protection persons who
prior to arrival have committed a “serious non-political crime”.43 The
Chief Justice found that article 1F(b) was not limited to fugitives from
justice. In addition, factors such as “post-crime events, like rehabilitation
or expiation” or current dangerousness could not figure in the evaluation of
a crime’s seriousness. Rather, the “seriousness” of a crime was fixed at the
time of its commission.44
As in B010, in Febles the Charter was only raised as a supporting
argument. In her opinion,45 the Chief Justice addressed that argument
by holding that section 7 of the Charter has “no role to play” in interpreting
the Refugee Convention’s exclusion clauses, as those clauses belong to an
international instrument.46 Further, the Charter had no interpretative
purchase with respect to section 98 of the IRPA, the provision incorporating

42

Supra, note 9.
“The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom
there are serious reasons for considering that: … (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee …” See art. 1F(b) of
the Refugee Convention, supra, note 35.
44
Febles, supra, note 9, at paras. 3 and 60.
45
The Chief Justice wrote for five judges of a seven-member panel. Justice Abella, joined
by Cromwell J, wrote a vigorous dissent but did not comment on the Charter issue: Febles, supra,
note 9.
46
Id., at para. 64.
43
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the exclusion clauses into the Act, because it lacks ambiguity.47 Finally —
and these are the important passages for the discussion that follows — the
Chief Justice said that section 98 would in any event be consistent with the
Charter because of the availability of a stay of removal through the PRRA
process:
… On such an application, the Minister would be required to balance
the risks faced by the appellant if removed against the danger the
appellant would present to the Canadian public if not removed … .
Section 7 of the Charter may also prevent the Minister from issuing a
removal order to a country where Charter-protected rights may be in
jeopardy: Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 58.48

She went on:
While the appellant would prefer to be granted refugee protection than
have to apply for a stay of removal, the Charter does not give a positive
right to refugee protection.49

Although in Febles the Chief Justice did not say how the availability
of a PRRA answered the Charter argument, in B010 she clarified that it
was because section 7 was not engaged prior to that stage:
… This Court recently held in Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2014 SCC 68, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 431, that a determination
of exclusion from refugee protection under the IRPA did not engage s.
7, because “even if excluded from refugee protection, the appellant is
able to apply for a stay of removal to a place if he would face death,
torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if removed to that
place” (para. 67). It is at this subsequent pre-removal risk assessment
stage of the IRPA’s refugee protection process that s. 7 is typically
engaged. The rationale from Febles, which concerned determinations
of “exclusion” from refugee status, applies equally to determinations of
‘inadmissibility’ to refugee status under the IRPA.50

That is, if section 7 is not engaged before the RPD, it follows that it is
not engaged by a decision regarding inadmissibility that would render
someone ineligible to go before the RPD. The answer to constitutional
concerns in both cases is the eventual access to a PRRA.
47
Section 98 of the IRPA states that: “A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of
the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.” Articles 1E
and 1F of the Convention are set out in a Schedule to the IRPA.
48
Febles, supra, note 9, at para. 67.
49
Id., at para. 68.
50
B010, supra, note 2, at para. 75.
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Read together, these passages may surprise those who believe that the
Singh decision from 1985 stands for the proposition that section 7 is
engaged by the determination of refugee protection claims51 and that
fundamental justice requires disclosure of the case to meet and oral
hearings to deal with credibility issues.52 After all, in Singh Wilson J.,
writing for three judges of a six-member panel, was “prepared to accept”
that section 7 applied to every person physically present in Canada53 and
that it was engaged in the case of refugee protection claimants because
the right to security of the person encompasses “freedom from the threat
of physical punishment or suffering as well as freedom from such
punishment itself”.54 She added:
… [I]f the appellants had been found to be Convention refugees … they
would have been entitled as a matter of law to the incidents of that
status provided for in the Act. Given the potential consequences for the
appellants of a denial of [Convention refugee] status if they are in fact
persons with a “well-founded fear of persecution”, it seems to me

51
See Pearl Eliadis, “The Swing from Singh: The Narrowing Application of the Charter in
Immigration Law” (1995) 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130, at 130-31 (“The first important principle emerging
from Singh is that persons physically present in Canada are entitled to have their claims adjudicated
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”); James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander
Neve, “Fundamental Justice and the Deflection of Refugees from Canada” (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 213-270, at para. 16 (“The Supreme Court of Canada determined in Singh v. Canada
(Employment and Immigration) that the Charter requires that refugee claimants physically present in
Canada be given an adequate opportunity to state their case, normally in the form of an oral
hearing.”); Martin Jones & Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law (Toronto, Irwin Law Inc., 2007), at 38 (“The
most well-known case involving section 7 is Singh v. Canada, which established a right to an oral
hearing for refugee claimants in Canada.”); Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee
Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38 Queen’s L.J. 1, at n. 5 (“As a matter of
constitutional law, refugee claimants are entitled to a hearing whenever credibility is at stake.”);
Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty
Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 58:3 McGill L.J. 663, at para. 10 (Justice
Wilson “concluded that the rights and interests at stake in refugee determination were sufficiently
serious that deprivation of those rights ‘must amount to deprivation of security of the person within
the meaning of s. 7.’ She further stated that, as a principle of fundamental justice, serious issues of
credibility must be determined on the basis of an oral hearing.”) I note that Hathaway and Neve, as
well as Jones and Baglay, go on to discuss the ways in which sub-Supreme Federal Court
jurisprudence drifted from this understanding of Singh, a drift I discuss in Section 4, below.
52
Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 59 (oral hearings) and para. 62 (discovery).
53
Id., at para. 35. This was the only holding from Singh cited by the Chief Justice in any of
Febles, B010, or Appulonappa, having been noted in Appulonappa, supra, note 1, at para. 23. Justice
Wilson wrote for herself, Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J. (as he then was). There is a long tradition of
ignoring the equally authoritative concurring decision of the other three justices, which reached
largely the same result relying on the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44. In the case of this
article, I continue in this tradition because of my focus on the Charter.
54
Id., at para. 47.
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unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle them to
fundamental justice in the adjudication of their status.55

When studying this passage, a reader should keep in mind here that
refugee “status” refers to the assemblage of rights and obligations
incident to being found to be a refugee. Beyond the right against removal
to a place where a person would be at risk (as noted, this is the principle
of non-refoulement),56 status includes also a host of other rights meant to
ensure that refugees, stripped of the protection of their state of origin,
may continue to lead meaningful lives, including in Canada a path to
permanent residence and eventually citizenship.57
Under the IRPA, this assemblage of rights comes with “protected
person” status that is conferred when one is granted “refugee protection”
by the RPD or RAD. Protected person status can also be conferred through
a PRRA application, but — importantly — not for persons who have been
found inadmissible on criminality- or security-related grounds (as in B010)
or excluded from refugee protection under article 1F (as in Febles); in such
cases, a finding of risk only leads to a stay of removal.58 Thus the Chief
Justice’s pronouncements in Febles and B010 suggest that claims for
refugee status do not engage section 7 of the Charter. On its face, this
conclusion seems to directly contradict Singh. What seemed unthinkable to
Wilson J. seems to have become thinkable.
Whether this is actually the case — whether there is an actual
contradiction — depends on what Singh says. Here matters are not as
clear as they might be.
As the first decision applying the Charter to immigration matters,
Singh was being written against a history of Canadian Bill of Rights59
case law in which the courts had routinely relied on the fact that
“immigration is a privilege and not a right”60 to dismiss rights claims by
non-citizens. This Bill of Rights case law reflected long-standing AngloAmerican doctrine that accorded broad, perhaps unlimited, discretion in
the setting and execution of their immigration policy. In other words,
Wilson J. was starting from the base line that “[a]t common law no alien
55

Id., at para. 52.
Refugee Convention, supra, note 35, at art. 33; IRPA, s. 115.
57
The Refugee Convention does not strictly enjoin signatory states to offer naturalization to
refugees: Refugee Convention, supra, note 35, at art. 34.
58
IRPA, s. 95(1)(b), (c), (2).
59
Supra, note 53.
60
Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 49, citing Walter Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of
Rights, 2d ed. (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975), at 273.
56
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has any right to enter this country except by leave of the Crown; and the
Crown can refuse leave without giving any reason. … He has no right
whatever to remain here.”61 At its strongest, this doctrine amounts to
denying the imperative of justifying immigration decisions to migrants
beyond ascertaining that a given decision conforms with statute and
policy. Put otherwise, the traditional doctrine may rest on the proposition
that immigration law and policy lie beyond the reach of anything but a
weak rule-of-law (or rule-by-law) constitutionalism, under which the
inquiry ends once it is ascertained that an official action conforms to the
statute or lies within the range of a statutorily authorized discretion.62
It stamps immigration governance as a reserved domain for arbitrariness.
Against this, Singh held out the promise of bringing immigration
governance within the embrace of a robust constitutionalism.63 In theory
if not in practice (no such argument appears to have been made), Singh
even held the potential to lead to the recognition of a Charter right to
asylum. This would be the “positive right to refugee protection”
expressly rejected by the Court in Febles.64 But, as I will now argue, in a
way that is deeply ironic, Singh’s promise of a more robust immigration
constitutionalism is undermined by gaps in Wilson J.’s own analysis.
Justice Wilson’s attempt to chart a path between the radical possibility
of a right to refugee protection and the traditional common law doctrine
led to cross-cutting ambiguities in her reasoning that yield several
readings of Singh. Two ambiguities in particular come out in trying to
answer the question of whether there is a conflict between Singh, on the
one hand, and Febles and B010, on the other. The first has to do with
whether section 7 is engaged because (a1) a statutory right to such
protection was provided under the Immigration Act, such that if no such
61
R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1973] 2 All E.R. 741, at 747 (C.A.), per Lord
Denning M.R. This passage was cited as authority in Prata v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and
Immigration), [1976] S.C.J. No. 38, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376, at 380 (S.C.C.), affg [1972] F.C.J. No. 129
(F.C.A.) and then again in Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992]
S.C.J. No. 27, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at para. 24 (S.C.C.), revg [1990] F.C.J. No. 157 (F.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Chiarelli”]. A classic statement is found in Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain,
[1904-07] All E.R. Rep. 582, [1906] A.C. 542 (P.C.).
62
David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 6-7, also 146-47.
63
Pearl Eliadis and Audrey Macklin both note that in the cases that followed Singh, most
notably Chiarelli, the Court has failed to subject the common law doctrine to Charter scrutiny:
Eliadis, “The Swing from Singh”, supra, note 51, at 139ff.; Audrey Macklin, “The Common Law,
the Constitution, and the Alien” (manuscript on file with author).
64
Supra, note 9. This is not such an outlandish suggestion, since such a right existed in
West Germany at the time: see Kay Hailbronner, “Fifty Years of the Basic Law — Migration,
Citizenship, and Asylum” (2000) 53 S.M.U.L.R. 519.
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statutory rights were granted, section 7 would not have been engaged; or
because (a2) of the interest in receiving protection, irrespective of the
rights accorded in the statute. The first of these possibilities (a1) rests on
the fact that throughout her decision, Wilson J. is at pains to point out
that Parliament itself saw fit to accord refugees several rights in the
Immigration Act, 1976.65 The second (a2) rests on Wilson J.’s emphasis
on consequences in the passage quoted above. More importantly, it rests
on her rejection in another part of her decision of the distinction between
rights and privileges.66 As noted, prior to the Charter this distinction had
been relied on to support analyses according to which a non-citizen could
assert no rights beyond those expressly provided by statute. That is,
because entry and sojourn were historically considered “privileges” at
common law, no extra-statutory rights protected non-citizens’ interests.67
It follows that, although Wilson J. expressly stated that she did not have
“to engage in a larger inquiry into the substantive rights conferred in the
Act”,68 her rejection of the rights-privilege dichotomy implies the
availability of such an inquiry.
The second ambiguity is between whether section 7 was said to be
engaged in Singh by (b1) the possibility of removal to a country where
the claimant would face “a threat of physical punishment or suffering”;69
or by (b2) the possibility of the denial of refugee status (now the status of
“protected person” conferred upon being granted “refugee protection”) to
a claimant. Here the first possibility (b1) rests on the manner in which
Wilson J. emphasizes the consequences of removal, as the key impact of
65
For instance, when she writes: “It seems to me that in attempting to decide whether the
appellants have been deprived of the right to life, liberty and security of the person within the
meaning of s. 7 of the Charter, we must begin by determining what rights the appellants have under
the Immigration Act, 1976.” See Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 41. Other key passages are found id.,
at para. 52 (“if the appellants had been found to be Convention refugees as defined in s. 2(1) of the
Immigration Act, 1976 they would have been entitled as a matter of law to the incidents of that status
provided for in the Act”; this passage in fact immediately precedes the “unthinkable” passage quoted
above in the main text); id. at para. 55 (“On these appeals this Court is being asked by the appellants
to accept that the substantive rights of Convention refugees have been determined by the Immigration
Act, 1976 itself and the Court need concern itself only with the question whether the procedural
scheme set up by the Act for the determination of that status is consistent with the requirements of
fundamental justice articulated in s. 7 of the Charter.”); and sundry less significant references to the
rights in the former Immigration Act, 1976.
66
Id., at para. 50.
67
The classic discussion of the rights-privileges distinction is found in William W. van
Alstyne, “The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law” (1968) 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 1439.
68
Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 55.
69
Id., at para. 47.
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the rejection of status. I believe it also relies, implicitly, on what many
would consider the implausibility of the suggestion that a non-citizen
might have a Charter-protected right to seek a status implying eventual
access to citizenship. The second possibility (b2) rests on Wilson J.’s
repeated reliance on the one hand on the entirety of rights accorded to
refugees under the Immigration Act, 1976 at the time;70 her reference in
the key passage quoted above to refugee status, in addition to the
consequences of removal itself; and the fact that a decision to deny
refugee status was not then, as it is not now, the final decision that would
have to be made prior to removal, so that the issue at stake before Wilson J.
really was status and not removal.71
At the risk of being artificially schematic, these two dimensions of
ambiguity yield the following table, illustrating four possible readings of
how Wilson J. found section 7 to be engaged by refugee claims:
Table 1: Four Readings of Singh
Section 7 is engaged
by …

… the risk upon
removal (b1)

… the chance of not
receiving refugee
status (b2)

… the statutory rights
conferred under the
Act (a1)

… the possible denial
of the statutory right
not to be removed.
(a1, b1)

… the possible denial
of the statutory right
to refugee status.
(a1, b2)

… the interests at stake
(a2)

… the (negative)
interest against being
removed to a risk
situation.
(a2, b1)

… the (affirmative)
interest in receiving
refugee status.
(a2, b2)

70
Id., at paras. 14 and 55. Hathaway and Neve emphasize this aspect of the decision, supra,
note 51, at para. 33.
71
At the time, a claim for refugee protection interrupted proceedings with respect to
removal. Once a non-citizen made a claim for refugee protection during an immigration inquiry into
his or her inadmissibility, the inquiry was adjourned for the determination of the claim. It was only if
a claim was denied that the inquiry resumed and the subsequent decision regarding inadmissibility
would be made. See Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 14. I thank David Vinokur for helpful discussion
of the scheme at the time.
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In this table, the lower right-hand cell (a2, b2) would represent the
greatest limitation on Canada’s power to control immigration, and also the
most robust form of immigration constitutionalism. If section 7 was
engaged by the interest in receiving refugee status, then any limitation on
the right to claim refugee status at any time and to have one’s claim heard
by a tribunal might engage section 7 and hence require a showing of
conformity with fundamental justice.72 What is more, the lower right-hand
cell is not obviously confinable to refugee claims alone. First, many noncitizens fighting inadmissibility and removal either claim to be refugees or
have been found to be them. Second, even if that were not the case, a focus
on status, and the range of interests associated with it, may suggest that
significant interests short of the threat of persecution may engage section
7. So we can see how the most robust reading of Singh potentially points to
a world in which most deportation decisions would have to be defended by
a showing that they were fundamentally just.
Febles and B010 contradict the two readings found in the right-hand
column of Table 1 ((a1, b2) and (a2, b2)); they therefore reject the radical
possibility that section 7 is engaged by the potential deprivation of
refugee status. However skeptical one might be of this possibility, it does
not need to be said that, from the point of view of constitutionalism, a
constitutional outcome ideally should be explained. The Chief Justice’s
statement that “[w]hile the appellant would prefer to be granted refugee
protection than have to apply for a stay of removal, the Charter does not
give a positive right to refugee protection”73 is not so much an
explanation as an instance of brazen question-begging.
Further, Febles and B010 could rest either on statutory rights to
protection against removal or on the interest in not being removed to a
situation of risk. That is, they themselves are ambiguous as between the
top and bottom cells of the left-hand column of Table 1 (as between (a1,
b1) and (a2, b1)). Here it should be recalled that in Febles, the Chief
Justice only said that section 7 “may … prevent the Minister from
issuing a removal order to a country where Charter-protected rights may
be in jeopardy”.74 For reasons I will now explain, however, it seems
72
Arguments along these lines were in fact attempted and rejected shortly after Singh. See,
e.g., Bendahmane v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] F.C.J. No. 31, 8
F.T.R. 241 (F.C.T.D.), revd on other grounds [1989] F.C.J. No. 304, [1989] 3 F.C. 16 (F.C.A.); but
see Tonato v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] F.C.J. No. 92, [1985] 1
F.C. 925 (F.C.T.D.).
73
Febles, supra, note 9, at para. 68.
74
Supra, note 48 (emphasis added).
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unlikely that this statement was meant to imply that section 7 protection
against removal to risk is contingent on a statutory right.

IV. TOWARD A WEAK READING OF SINGH
I offer this explanation in the course of a truncated account of how we
got from Singh to Febles and B010. This is a complex story to which I
cannot do justice here, but which I will describe as the product of three
developments.
The first development is the introduction in 1989, as part of a delayed
statutory response to Singh, of ineligibility provisions that aimed, initially,
at preventing repeat claims being made within a short time frame, claims
by persons who had been granted refugee protection in other countries, and
other provisions aimed at the perceived mischief of so-called “asylum
shopping”; amendments that came into force in 1992 added ineligibility if
a claimant had transited through a “safe third country” and, crucially, for
past criminal offences.75 (Note that, before February 1993, there was no
subsequent review for risk corresponding to today’s PRRA;76 further,
before 1995, it had not been found that enforcement officers had discretion
to defer removal.77)
If Singh stands for the proposition that the denial of refugee status or
the potential consequences of removal to a risk situation, in the absence
of corresponding statutory rights, engages section 7, then it seems clear
that ineligibility provisions would do so as well. However, while some
cases seemed to go the other way,78 it was established in short order that
75
For an argument that ineligibility grounds of this kind are unconstitutional, see Mark
Anthony Drumbl, “Canada’s New Immigration Act: An Affront to the Charter and Canada’s
Collective Conscience?” (1994) 24 R.D.U.S. 385.
76
The Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, as amended by SOR/93-44 established
the Post-Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada Class — precursor to the PRRA — effective
February 1, 1993: Bochnakov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J.
No. 271, 91 F.T.R. 93, at para. 2 (F.C.T.D.).
77
Poyanipur v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No. 1785,
116 F.T.R. 4 (F.C.T.D.); see also Wang, supra, note 17.
78
See Noor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] Q.J. No. 722, at
para. 67 (Que. S.C.), revd [1990] J.Q. no 289 (Que. C.A.). Other decisions had relied on s. 7 to
invalidate formal bars to refugee determination or redetermination, which were similar in effect to
ineligibility provisions in that they disentitled a non-citizen to claim refugee protection. Thus Kaur v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] F.C.J. No. 1100, [1990] 2 F.C. 209
(F.C.A.) and Mattia v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] F.C.J. No. 247,
[1987] 3 F.C. 492 (F.C.T.D.) found that s. 7 mandated that an immigration inquiry be reopened so
that a non-citizen could make a claim for refugee status if he or she had been prevented from doing
so because of duress or mental illness. In Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
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ineligibility determinations by themselves and in general did not engage
section 7 of the Charter.
Most important in this regard was the 1991 Federal Court of Appeal
case Berrahma, a case involving a refugee protection claimant ineligible to
make a claim because he had been rejected less than 90 days earlier.79
Rather than determining whether that ineligibility criterion or
determination complied with fundamental justice, in Berrahma Marceau
J.A. simply found that section 7 was not engaged. He reasoned that section 7
did not impose a positive duty on the government “to provide protection to
everyone whose life or liberty may be at risk, still less to provide a refuge
for all inhabitants of the globe who may fear for their lives or security”;
rather “for it to be applicable, there must be a specific act, legislation, not
merely a failure to act.”80 In Singh, he continued, section 7 was engaged
because “[Mr.] Singh was denied a status which the law gave him the right
to claim without having any opportunity of showing that he met the
conditions for obtaining it, whereas the ineligible claimant is not denied a
status he is entitled to claim.”81
We are here in the upper row of Table 1 ((a1, b1) and (a1, b2)), the
most conservative readings of Singh. Note just how thoroughly this
reading of Singh evades constitutionalism. If a statutory entitlement is
necessary to engage section 7, then it is within Parliament’s power to
evade obligations of fundamental justice toward refugees simply by
omitting refugee protection and rights against removal from immigration
legislation.
Berrahma has been repeatedly affirmed for the proposition that neither
ineligibility provisions nor determinations engage section 7 of the
Charter.82 However, the courts have retreated from its strongest implications.
Immigration), [1989] F.C.J. No. 613, [1989] 3 F.C. 487 (F.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal found
that s. 7 required that the Immigration Appeal Board (I.A.B.) have the discretion to grant extensions
of time to applicants seeking the redetermination of the Minister’s decision on their claim.
79
Berrahma v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] F.C.J. No. 180,
132 N.R. 202 (F.C.A.).
80
Id., at para. 11.
81
Id., at para. 12.
82
See Nguyen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 47,
[1993] 1 F.C. 696, at para. 8 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1993] S.C.C.A. No. 103 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Nguyen”]; Hernandez v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1993] F.C.J. No. 950, at para. 13
(F.C.T.D.); Gervasoni v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] F.C.J. No. 475,
110 F.T.R. 297 (F.C.T.D.); Jekula v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998]
F.C.J. No. 1503, [1999] 1 F.C. 266 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter “Jekula”]; Raza v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1826, [1999] 2 F.C. 185 (F.C.T.D.); Soe v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 913, 2007 FC 671 (F.C.); J.P., supra,
note 39, at para. 123. At times the courts have nonetheless said that, in the circumstances of a case,
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This may be on account of two important Supreme Court decisions that
followed soon after. The first of these was Kindler,83 which found that
extradition to face the death penalty engaged section 7 but did not violate
the principles of fundamental justice. In a concurring opinion supporting
this conclusion, La Forest J. invoked the common law principle of broad
state discretion over immigration matters: “The Government has the right
and duty to keep out and to expel aliens from this country if it considers it
advisable to do so.”84 Next, in Chiarelli,85 the Supreme Court — citing
Kindler but ignoring Singh — held that the deportation of a long-time
permanent resident, who was not a refugee or a refugee claimant, on
grounds of criminality did not violate the principles of fundamental justice.
This result flowed from the observation, often repeated since, that the
principles of fundamental justice in the immigration context had to be
determined in light of the “most fundamental principle of immigration
law”, namely “that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or
remain in the country”.86
Once Kindler and Chiarelli were decided, the courts increasingly gave
them analytical prominence over Singh; this is the second development
that led to Singh’s weakening. This prominence is important for a number
of reasons. Most obvious, by endorsing the traditional common law
principle regarding immigration matters, Kindler and Chiarelli suggested
that whatever Singh stood for, it could not be that section 7 mandates the
grant of permanent status to refugees. Kindler and Chiarelli further seemed
to affirm that Singh could have no bearing on the deportation of non-citizen
criminals, at least outside the refugee context.87 It is of great importance,
then, that two Federal Court of Appeal decisions that followed soon after
seemed to demand a reconciliation of Singh’s assertion of the Charter
rights of refugees, on the one hand, and Kindler and Chiarelli’s reassertion
of the traditional immigration law power on the other.

s. 7 may be engaged: see Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Agbasi, [1993]
F.C.J. No. 113, [1993] 2 F.C. 620 (F.C.T.D.).
83
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kindler”]. Kindler was decided on September 26, 1991; Berrahma had been
decided on February 21, 1991.
84
Id., at para. 133 (per La Forest J.).
85
Chiarelli, supra, note 61.
86
Id., at para. 24.
87
In Kindler, supra, note 83, at para. 133, La Forest J. also added: “I am aware that on
humane grounds, provision is now made for the admission of political refugees, but that, of course,
has no relevance here.”
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Barrera88 was a judicial review by the Federal Court of Appeal of a
decision to issue a deportation order on criminal grounds against a Chilean
national who had been recognized as a refugee. Justice MacGuigan dealt
with a section 7 argument summarily, without considering the fact that
Mr. Barrera was a refugee, on the basis that deportation of criminal
non-citizens did not engage the right to liberty; he did not consider security
of the person or the potential relevance of Singh.89 Mr. Barrera’s refugee
status was instead approached as potentially giving rise to a problem with
respect to the guarantee against cruel and unusual treatment found in
section 12 of the Charter. On this point, MacGuigan J.A. found Mr. Barrera’s
Charter challenge premature because “it is only a return to Chile which
could conceivably put the appellant in any s. 12 danger, and it is only the
Minister who has the statutory power to subject him to that danger.”90
In the context of section 12 jurisprudence, this finding makes some
sense, as the Supreme Court had found in Kindler that section 12 requires
a stronger link between the impugned government action and the potential
harm than challenges under section 7.91 But the idea of prematurity was
applied the next year by the Federal Court of Appeal in Nguyen in the
context of section 7.92
Nguyen involved a non-citizen who sought to claim refugee status at a
hearing into his inadmissibility but was found ineligible to make a claim
due to convictions for serious offences. Justice Marceau found that the
constitutionality of the finding that Mr. Nguyen was removable on
criminal grounds was “easy to verify” following Kindler and Chiarelli.93
He then found section 7 was not engaged by the ineligibility decision.
Contrary to the approach he had taken in Berrahma, he now relied on
prematurity: “a declaration of ineligibility does not imply or lead, in
itself, to any positive act which may affect life, liberty or security of the
person.”94 This makes less sense than the use of prematurity under
88
Barrera v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] F.C.J. No. 1127,
[1993] 2 F.C. 3 (F.C.A.). In this case, the Appeal Division relied on an unreported Trial Division
case, Donoso v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), since reported at [1989] F.C.J.
No. 645, 30 F.T.R. 241 (F.C.T.D.), for the principle of prematurity.
89
Id., at para. 11.
90
Id.
91
Kindler, supra, note 83, at para. 169 (per McLachlin J.); United States v. Burns, [2001]
S.C.J. No. 8, 2001 SCC 7, at paras. 54-57 (S.C.C.), affg [1997] B.C.J. No. 1558 (B.C.C.A.).
92
Nguyen, supra, note 82, at para. 8.
93
Id., at para. 7 (F.C.) (“The constitutional validity of the [inadmissibility] decision … is easy
to verify, especially following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kindler … and Chiarelli … .”).
94
Id., at para. 8 (F.C.). Justice Marceau changed his gloss on Singh, saying that Wilson J.’s
finding of s. 7 engagement in that case was based on the fact that the “right to claim refugee status”
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section 12, given that Wilson J. in Singh had found that the right to
security of the person was engaged by a mere “threat” and given that the
potential for an eventual infringement engages section 7 throughout
criminal and extradition proceedings.95
Justice Marceau’s analysis in Nguyen included two further nuances.
The first is that, although he found that neither the inadmissibility nor the
ineligibility decisions in isolation engaged section 7, the two decisions in
combination did; he went on to find, however, that there was no violation
of substantive or procedural principles of fundamental justice.96 Then, at
the end of his opinion, he added the following remark:
It would be my opinion, however, that the Minister would act in direct
violation of the Charter if he purported to execute a deportation order
by forcing the individual concerned back to a country where, on the
evidence, torture and possibly death will be inflicted. It would be, it
seems to me, … at the very least, an outrage to public standards of
decency, in violation of the principles of fundamental justice under
section 7 of the Charter.97

This passage is, at least, in tension with his reasoning in Berrahma,
acknowledging as it does a principle of fundamental justice that is not
statutorily contingent. Why the shift? Without wishing to make a strong
explanatory claim here (since other extradition cases had already found
that surrender decisions engaged section 7 prior to Berrahma98), it is
had been previously granted. So now s. 7 was engaged not by the right to refugee protection made
available by statute, but by the fact that the right to claim such status had already been granted.
95
See Stewart, supra, note 19, at 236 and 272. Given space constraints, I do not consider
here whether this broader availability of s. 7 in the criminal and extradition contexts should be
extended to the immigration context (see my comment, supra, note 7). The point is only that the
concrete result is that outcomes in the immigration context are less justified than outcomes in the
criminal and extradition contexts.
96
Nguyen, supra, note 82. Justice Marceau attributed this style of reasoning to the Supreme
Court in Chiarelli, supra, note 61. See also Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1990] F.C.J. No. 157, [1990] 2 F.C. 299 (F.C.A.), revd [1992] S.C.J. No. 27 (S.C.C.);
Grewal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] F.C.J. No. 913, [1992] 1 F.C.
581 (F.C.A.); Kaberuka v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J.
No. 1093, [1995] 3 F.C. 252 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter “Kaberuka”]. More recently, see the decision of
Mactavish J. in Atawnah v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
[2015] F.C.J. No. 782¸ 2015 FC 774, at para. 67 (F.C.), affd [2016] F.C.J. No. 481 (F.C.A.).
97
Id.
98
See Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 24, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42 (S.C.C.),
affg [1984] O.J. No. 2647 (Ont. C.A.). Justice Marceau himself wrote the lead opinion for the
Federal Court of Appeal panel whose decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kindler:
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1988] F.C.J. No. 1153, [1989] 2 F.C. 492 (F.C.A.), affd
[1991] S.C.J. No. 63 (S.C.C.). Justice Marceau’s opinion did not deal with s. 7, but the concurring
opinion of Pratte J.A. appears to presuppose that s. 7 was engaged in that case.
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nonetheless the case that Kindler confirmed that in the context of
extradition, a surrender decision to potentially face the death penalty
engages section 7,99 while Chiarelli declined to decide whether the
removal of a long-term permanent resident engages section 7 by itself.100
In the face of these reasons, it seems harder to maintain a claim that
section 7 was entirely contingent on statutory rights. This last finding by
Marceau J.A. is also consistent with the later holding in Suresh, which was
cited by the Chief Justice in Febles, as it is with later pronouncements by
the Federal Court of Appeal that “a risk assessment and determination
conducted in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice is a
condition precedent to a valid determination to remove an individual.”101
Again without wishing to make a strong explanatory claim, I believe the
courts were comfortable with making this move because they saw
themselves as recognizing only a negative right against removal, while at
the same time denying any Charter-protected affirmative right to some sort
of permanent status.
Barrera introduced the idea of prematurity, but in the context of an
analysis under section 12 of the Charter. Justice Marceau’s analysis in
Nguyen employed the same idea in the context of section 7, but with the
important nuance that, although an ineligibility decision would not engage
section 7, the overall statutory scheme would.102 The third and final
development in the story is the subsequent reaffirmation that it is
premature to raise section 7 prior to a decision pertaining to removal, while
denying the need to examine the statutory scheme as a whole as was done
in Nguyen. This principle is set out in Jekula, a 1998 case of the Federal
Court-Trial Division.103 It has since been repeated many times over in
cases involving many different kinds of proceedings before the IRB
involving refugee protection claimants, including vacation decisions,104

99

Kindler, supra, note 83, at para. 171 (per McLachlin J.) and para, 127 (per La Forest J.)

(S.C.C.).
100

Chiarelli, supra, note 61, at para. 21.
Farhadi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 646, 27
N.R. 158, at para. 3 (F.C.A.).
102
Supra, note 96.
103
Jekula, supra, note 82, at para. 33, affd [2000] F.C.J. No. 1956, 266 N.R. 355 (F.C.A.).
As authority for this passage, Evans J. (as he then was) relied on Kaberuka, supra, note 96.
However, Kaberuka had found that while ineligibility determinations by themselves did not engage
s. 7, the joint operation of the ineligibility determinations in combination with the provision allowing
for removal did engage s. 7, a finding Evans J. ignored.
104
Coomaraswamy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No.
603, 2002 FCA 153, at para. 24 (F.C.A.), affg [2001] F.C.J. No. 183 (F.C.T.D.).
101
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cessation decisions,105 decisions regarding whether to grant refugee
protection,106 decisions (like Febles) to exclude persons from refugee
protection107 and inadmissibility decisions (like B010).108
Thus the four possible readings of Singh were winnowed down to one
— (a2, b1) in Table 1 — by the sub-Supreme Federal Courts. In those
courts, Singh lost its constitutional vitality long ago, weakened by its
own ambiguities and by the renewed avowal of a broad immigration
power in Kindler and Chiarelli. Despite this fact, however, the possibility
persisted that in the eyes of the Supreme Court, Singh still stood for
fundamental justice before the IRB. In Dehghani, from 1993, Iacobucci J.
wrote for a unanimous Court that in Singh, “Wilson J. held that since the
refugee claim determination process has the potential to deprive a
Convention refugee of security of the person, the determination process
must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.”109 And in its last
mention of this feature of Wilson J.’s opinion, in the 2007 Charkaoui
decision, the Court cited Singh for the proposition that section 7 could be
engaged by the process for determining the reasonableness of security
certificates, which are jointly issued by the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety to certify a non-citizen as
inadmissible on security or other grounds, because such certificates “may
lead to removal from Canada, to a place where his or her life would be
threatened”,110 Indeed, after referring to Charkaoui, the Federal Court of
Appeal in Benitez undertook a section 7 analysis with respect to
proceedings before the RPD without raising the issue of engagement.111
On the strength of these pronouncements, it was still just possible to
hold onto a robust reading of Singh. This was possible because of
everything the courts below had never fully explained: why section 7
105
Romero v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2014] F.C.J. No. 720, 2014 FC 671,
at paras. 120-124 (F.C.).
106
Laidlow v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2012] F.C.J. No. 150, 2012 FC 144,
at paras. 62-63 (F.C.), affd [2012] F.C.J. No. 1270, 2012 FCA 256, at para. 15 (F.C.A.).
107
Shephard v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] F.C.J. No. 494, 2008 FC 379,
at para. 32 (F.C.).
108
Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 381,
2005 FCA 85, at para. 63 (F.C.A.), affg [2004] F.C.J. 384 (F.C.).
109
Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] S.C.J. No. 38,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) (original emphasis), affg [1990] F.C.J. No. 558 (F.C.A.).
110
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 2007 SCC 9, at
para. 14 (S.C.C.), revg [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060 (F.C.A.) (emphasis added).
111
Benitez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 735, 2007 FCA 199
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 391 (S.C.C.). Another decision that assumed
that s. 7 was engaged at the refugee claim stage is Cota v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] F.C.J. No. 872 (F.C.T.D.).
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would not be engaged in refugee claims in a manner analogous to
criminal and extradition proceedings; why a doctrine of prematurity that
originated under section 12 of the Charter also applies under section 7;
why the “fundamental principle of immigration law” enunciated in
Chiarelli does not give way when refugee status is at stake. In Febles and
B010, the Chief Justice aligned herself with the lower courts without
providing answers to any of these questions.

V. PORTRAIT OF A WEAK IMMIGRATION CONSTITUTIONALISM
Once again, such an explanatory gap is disappointing from the point
of view of the practice of constitutionalism. In this last section, I also
want to highlight the ways in which the Chief Justice’s pronouncements
allow for the restructuring of our system of refugee protection in a way
that minimizes Canada’s justificatory obligations, rendering even more
remote the ideal of constitutionalism in immigration governance. Before
reviewing these structural implications, it is helpful to recap. In Febles
and B010, the Chief Justice suggested that for refugee claimants, section
7 of the Charter is engaged only prior to removal during a PRRA, and
only insofar as the PRRA may lead to a stay of removal; not, that is,
insofar as the PRRA may lead to refugee status. For the Chief Justice, it
followed that section 7 is not engaged before the IRB, either in refugee
protection proceedings or in inadmissibility proceedings that may
preclude access to the RPD. Febles and B010 also suggest that
fundamental justice at the PRRA stage requires a balancing of the risks
that a foreign national or permanent resident would face against the
danger the person would pose to the Canadian public.112 There is no
mention in either decision of a requirement for an oral hearing to deal
with credibility issues, as Singh suggested.113

112

Febles, supra, note 9, at para. 67.
Supra, note 10. It is notable in this regard that in Suresh, cited by the Chief Justice in
Febles, the Supreme Court found that no oral hearing was required during the process for
determining whether or not to issue a danger opinion that would allow for removal of a person to a
country where they would be at risk of torture: Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 2002 SCC 1, at para. 121 (S.C.C.), revg [2000] F.C.J. No. 5
(F.C.A.). Gerald Heckman has pointed out to me that Mr. Suresh had had access to an oral hearing
(lasting 50 days) in the determination of the reasonableness of the security certificate to which he
was subject. Perhaps such an argument could be made, but the issues at stake with respect to the
reasonableness of a security certificate and the balancing of risk are in substance different, as well as
being presided over in the one case by a judge and in the other by a Minister.
113
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A first anomalous implication of the resulting picture is that it runs up
against the widely held view that Singh led to the creation of the IRB and
what is today the RPD.114 With its system of mandatory oral hearings at
the RPD115 and appeals (though not in all cases116) to the RAD, the IRB is
the administrative decision-maker that provides the greatest procedural
protections for risk determinations under the IRPA. The RPD and RAD are
also the only decision-makers established under the IRPA with section 52
constitutional competence with respect to the legislative provisions bearing
on refugee protection.117 If section 7 is not engaged by refugee protection
claims before the IRB, and if it can be satisfied by balancing as part of a
largely paper review prior to removal, it is not clear whether the many
cumbersome safeguards and rules that now saddle refugee protection
determinations at the IRB could not be done away with. Indeed, the RPD
and the RAD themselves seem to be constitutionally optional.
A second anomalous implication arises because factual and legal
findings made at the IRB by either the RPD or the RAD (in the case of
refugee protection claims) or by the Immigration Division or Immigration
Appeal Division (in the case of inadmissibility cases) have a significant
downstream impact during PRRA applications. That impact is in part
because a PRRA, unlike the RAD, is not an appeal. Factual findings made
by the IRB’s divisions will be taken as a given, unless they can be
displaced by admissible evidence of new risk developments.118 Since many
of the factual findings by the RPD and/or RAD will touch on credibility, it
is hard to see how one could meaningfully evaluate the conformity of a
PRRA decision with fundamental justice without taking into account the
justice of upstream IRB determinations. Here it should be recalled that in
Bedford, the Supreme Court had found that to engage section 7, all that is
114
Ninette Kelley & Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: The History of
Canadian Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), at 414-15. A series of
reports on the refugee status determination system in Canada prior to Singh had also been critical of
the existing system; all three called for oral hearings for all claims: id., at 413.
115
Except in cases where a claim is approved and the Minister has not given notice of an
intention to intervene: IRPA, s. 170(b) and (f).
116
IRPA, s. 110(2).
117
That is, competence to find that legislation is of no force or effect under s. 52(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Members of the
RPD and RAD do not, obviously, have the power to strike legislation down.
118
Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 1632, 2007 FCA
385, at para. 12 (F.C.A.), affg [2006] F.C.J. No. 1779 (F.C.). This decision pre-dated the coming-into-force
of the RAD, so in claiming that the PRRA is not an appeal of a RAD decision, I am extending a principle
found in Raza with respect to RPD decisions. Evidence during a PRRA is admissible only if it “arose after
the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected
in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection”: IRPA, s. 113(a).
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required is “a sufficient causal connection” between the government law or
conduct and the infringement of the right to life, liberty, or security of the
person.119 Given the impact of the RPD and RAD decisions on the later
PRRA process, it is unclear why those prior decisions would not have a
“sufficient causal connection” to the potential rights infringements faced
by refugees or refugee protection claimants upon removal to a country
where their life, liberty, or security of the person would be at risk.
Moreover, the connection between the IRB and the PRRA is not merely
causal. The two decision points are also linked by the fact that they apply
the same substantive statutory provisions, sections 96 to 98 of the IRPA, in
making protection decisions.120 Even if section 98 is free from ambiguity,
as the Chief Justice held in Febles, this is not likely to be true of sections 96
and 97. These provisions set out, respectively, the Convention refugee
definition and certain grounds for general human rights protection. The
RPD and the RAD are the source of most of the case law regarding these
provisions. To find, as the Chief Justice did, that section 7 cannot be invoked
in their interpretation before the RPD or the RAD walls off these provisions
and this case law from meaningful Charter scrutiny, just as it walls off the
most important fact-finding stage in what is really an interconnected
decision-making scheme.
The third and final structural implication of Febles and B010 stems
from the fact that the PRRA is not actually the last possible decision made
prior to removal. Among the former Conservative government’s reforms to
the IRPA were provisions establishing that persons rejected by the RPD
and/or RAD, or whose claims are withdrawn or abandoned, are not entitled
to a PRRA before either 12 months or 36 months have passed (these are
commonly referred to as the “PRRA bars”),121 with the latter being the
case for nationals of purportedly safe “designated countries of origin”.122
119

Bedford, supra, note 19, at para. 75.
IRPA, ss. 96-98.
121
IRPA, s. 112(2)(c).
122
Designated countries of origin (“DCOs”) are countries designated under s. 109.1 of
IRPA. That provision provides for designation, either based on quantitative criteria (which criteria
are established according by Ministerial orders that are not legislatively constrained) or qualitative
assessments based on whether the country has an independent judiciary, protects “basic democratic
rights and freedoms”, and “civil society organizations” exist. A provision (IRPA, s. 110(2)(d.1))
denying nationals of DCOs a right of appeal to the RAD was found unconstitutional by the Federal
Court last year: Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] F.C.J. No. 880,
2015 FC 892 (F.C.). The new Liberal government abandoned an appeal of that decision (see The
Canadian Press, “Liberals drop legal appeal of unconstitutional Conservative refugee measure”
(January 4, 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-drop-legal-appeal-of-unconstitutionalconservative-refugee-measure-1.3389336>. They have also pledged to use a committee of human
120
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No PRRA will take place if they are removed within these timelines. If it is
the case that section 7 is not engaged before the IRB, then persons
removed prior to receiving a PRRA may never get access to a process in
which their rights must be determined in accordance with fundamental
justice. If the various protections included with refugee protection
determination at the RPD or RAD were removed, as in principle they can
be, this concern would no longer be purely academic. Two Charter
challenges to the PRRA bars have gone to the Federal Court of Appeal.123
These have failed because persons who do not have access to a PRRA may
nonetheless either ask an enforcement officer to defer removal or seek a
judicial stay of removal: so just as the Chief Justice turned aside Charter
arguments with respect to determinations at the IRB by pointing to the
PRRA, the Federal Court of Appeal has now turned aside Charter
arguments with respect to the bars on access to a PRRA by pointing to
these later decision points. Faced with a request for a deferral, an
enforcement officer must consider whether the individual has provided
sufficient new evidence (that is, evidence not previously assessed) that
they would be exposed to “a risk of death, extreme sanction or inhumane
treatment”.124 If appealed to the Supreme Court and upheld, this line of
reasoning suggests even PRRAs need not be made available for everyone
under the Charter.
In sum, after B010 and Febles, greater procedural protections, as well
as Charter competence, now reside in a Board before which section 7
challenges to immigration proceedings and legislation are premature and
which itself may be constitutionally optional. All that may be required by
section 7 of the Charter is a system under which a CBSA enforcement
officer screens written requests for deferrals of removal for cases where
there may be sufficient evidence to establish a risk of death, extreme
sanction or inhumane treatment. In those cases, the person may be required
to receive a PRRA. The result seems to be a profound mismatch of
legislative design and the courts’ Charter jurisprudence.
rights experts for designation of countries. However, they have not disavowed other aspects of the
DCO regime, including the 36-month PRRA bar.
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Savunthararasa v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
[2016] F.C.J. No. 173, 2016 FCA 51 (F.C.A.), affg [2014] F.C.J. No. 1133 (F.C.) and Atawnah v.
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2016] F.C.J. No. 481, 2016 FCA
144 (F.C.A.), affg [2015] F.C.J. No. 782 (F.C.).
124
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Shpati, [2011] F.C.J.
No. 1454, 2011 FCA 286, at paras. 43-44 (F.C.A.), revg [2010] F.C.J. No. 1275 (F.C.); see also
Baron v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2009] F.C.J. No. 314,
2009 FCA 81 (F.C.A.), affg [2008] F.C.J. No. 434 (F.C.).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Appulonappa and B010, the government sought to defend a broad
warrant to prosecute or find inadmissible those who help persons enter
Canada contrary to the IRPA, even when the beneficiaries are asylum
seekers and the help is provided for humanitarian or other non-pecuniary
motives; indeed, even when the targets of enforcement are themselves
asylum seekers. The Court declined to give them that warrant. This was
obviously a good result for those concerned about migrants’ rights, and
more specifically with the use of anti-smuggling initiatives to claw back
access to refugee protection.
Nonetheless, I have argued that the Chief Justice’s two unanimous
opinions are disappointing if one favours a robust immigration
constitutionalism. First, the Chief Justice’s analysis of the section 7 Charter
claim in Appulonappa rested on a methodology that takes for granted the
constitutional soundness of Parliament’s policy goals and inquires only
into the rationality of the means used to secure those goals. Such an
analysis cannot be expected to yield principles of lasting power.
The results are always liable to be disrupted by legislative change, such
as the amendments to the offence of organizing illegal entry found in
section 117 of the IRPA. Second, the Chief Justice in B010 confirmed an
approach to section 7 of the Charter, which had been hinted at the year
before in Febles and foreshadowed by years of sub-Supreme Federal Court
case law, that will make constitutional justification harder to access and the
protection of refugees more precarious. Third, the Chief Justice did not
acknowledge that this position might depart from that espoused by Wilson J.
in Singh, nor examine the impact her decision would have on the
application of the Charter to refugee determination, nor take up basic
questions, such as why section 7 is engaged in the realm of immigration
and refugee law in a manner so at odds with criminal and extradition law.
The result is an immigration constitutionalism that is inadequately
explained and more likely to allow for unjustified decisions.

